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PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
Few rules of law command such a large following as the
common law rule that only actual or compensatory, not puni-
tive damages, may be recovered in an action for breach of
contract.' The sole exception at common law was an action
for breach of promise of marriage2 in which exemplary dam-
ages were recoverable because the measure of damages appli-
cable to ordinary contracts was wholly inadequate.
Several common law jurisdictions, however, have devel-
oped further exceptions to the general rule and allow recov-
ery of punitive damages for breach of contract in some other
situations, but these states are a small, but growing minority.
The purpose of this discussion is to analyze these exceptions,
especially as to the rule in South Carolina. 3
Certain closely related situations will have to be distin-
guished. This note does not purport to analyze the law other
than in those cases which proceed on a contract theory to
recover actual damages for the breach of contract itself,
i. e., actions ex contractu as distinguished from those ex de-
licto, and in which punitive damages are also recovered. Thus,
tort actions for fraud and deceit are excluded from consid-
eration except for comparison. Likewise excluded are those
tort cases in which the duty which the defendant breached
arose out of a contract or was a duty owed to the public
whose breach also involved breach of a private contract.4
1. E.g., Addis v. Gramophone Company, Ltd., [19091 A. C. 488, 3
B. R. C. 98, 16 Ann. Cas. 98 (House of Lords). See, e.g., Hurxthal v. St.
Lawrence Boom & Lumber Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S. E. 520, 97 Am. St.
Rep. 954 (1903).
2. E.g., Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N. Y. 474, 1 Am. Rep. 561 (1870);
Drobnich v. Bach, 159 Minn. 258, 198 N. W. 669 (1924). See, e.g., Mor-
gan v. Muench, 181 Iowa 719, 156 N. W. 819 (1916); Baumle v. Verde,
33 Okla. 243, 124 Pac. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1914B 317 (1912).
3. See annotation, 84 A. L. R. 1345. For a more complete discussion
of the insurance aspects of the problem and the South Carolina insur-
ance cases allowing recovery of punitive damages, see Howser, The
Awarding of Punitive Damages for Breach of Insurance Contracts in
South Carolina, 1 S. C. L. Q. 150 (1948). Mr. Howser's discussion in-
cludes tort cases in fraud and deceit as well as those for breach of con-
tract accompanied by a fraudulent act.
4. Such as suits against telegraph companies for non-delivery of mes-
sages, against power companies for failure to supply electricity, or
against common carriers for wrongful ejection.
444
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It has sometimes been said that South Carolina is the only
state in which punitive damages may be recovered for breach
of contract.5 This is not strictly accurate, for several other
American jurisdictions are in the minority with South Caro-
lina.
TEXAS. Texas has a rule which we may term the "inde-
pendent tort" rule which allows recovery of punitive damages
for breach of contract if the breach is accompanied by an in-
dependent tort which is aggravated. For punitive damages to
be recovered in such an action on contract, the breach must
be accompanied by a tort for which an action would lie in
which punitive damages could be recovered for the tort, inde-
pendently of any right to recover actual damages for the
breach of contract alone.6 Thus, the tort itself must be fraud-
ulent, malicious or oppressive.7 The manner in which the con-
tract is breached may amount to a tort;8 or the tort may
consist of some other act which accompanies the breach of
contract.9 However, the tort must be connected with the
breach of contract;1O therefore, if it occurs after the breach,
no punitive damages can be recovered in an action on the
contract."1
In one case illustrating the Texas rule, an employer not
only discharged the plaintiff, but also slandered her by calling
her a liar; she recovered actual damages for the breach of
the employment contract and punitive damages for the slan-
der, for it was an independent tort.'12 Another defendant
breached his contract to grant plaintiff a concession in a
department store to operate a meat market and then refused
to let plaintiff remove his equipment unless he released his
cause of action for breach of contract; the independent tort
5. Mooney, Punitive Damages for Breach of Insurance Contracts in
South Carolina, Insurance Law Journal, Jan. 1955, p. 20; Howser, supra
note 3, at 150.
6. See Hooks v. Fitzenrieter, 76 Tex. 277, 13 S. W. 230 (1890).
7. See Briggs v. Rodriguez, 236 S. W. 2d 510, 515 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951).
8. See Hooks v. Fitzenrieter, note 6, supra; e.g., National Finance Co.
v. Abernathy, 66 S. W. 2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
9. E.g., Scheps v. Giles, 222 S. W. 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
10. See A. L. Carter Lumber Co. v. Saide, 140 Tex. 523, 168 S. W.
2d 629 (1943); National Finance Co. v. Fregia, 78 S. W. 2d 1081 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935).
11. Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 170 S. W. 1062, 1066 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914).
12. Scheps v. Giles, 222 S. W. 348 (Tx. Civ. App. 1920).
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was the conversion.' 3 And in another case, defendant de-
frauded ignorant and illiterate Mexicans in a land sale con-
tract and they recovered $300 actual damages for breach of
contract and $1,000 punitive damages for fraud. 14
The rule in South Carolina, as we shall presently see, is
that in an action for breach of contract, punitive damages
are recoverable if the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent
act. The Texas rule seems broader than that in South Caro-
lina, for it allows punitive damages for any kind of independ-
ent aggravated tort, while ours is restricted to fraud. How-
ever, in Texas in cases where a fraudulent act accompanies
the breach of contract, there is the restrictive requirement
that the fraudulent act inflict some other and different
injury besides that flowing from the breach of contract with-
out fraud in order for the plaintiff to recover punitive dam-
ages. 1r There is no such requirement of additional injury
in South Carolina. Seemingly, the South Carolina rule has
been developed further than the Texas rule within its own
more narrow limits because of the greater volume of cases
applying it; and our rule has been developed most extensively
in the field of insurance contracts into which the Texas rule
has not yet been extended.
NEW MEXICO. The situation as to the law in New Mexico
is most interesting. An earlier tort case there for fraud and
deceit had said by way of dicta that punitive damages were
recoverable when the breach was accompanied by a fraudu-
lent act or when the wrongdoing was aggravated, wanton, or
maliciously intentional. 1 In a recent case the Supreme Court
adopted this dictum as law and affirmed an award of punitive
damages for breach of contract where the defendant, a seed
buyer under contract to plaintiff, had falsified weight records,
the falsification being a fraudulent act.17 The Court seemed
to adopt the South Carolina "fraudulent act" rule expressly,
citing our case of Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal
Co.' 8
13. Morgan v. Steinberg, 23 S. W. 2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
14. Briggs v. Rodriguez, 236 S. W. 2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
15. Littlefield v. Clayton Brothers, 194 S. W. 194, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917).
16. Stewart v. Potter, 44 N. M. 460, 104 P. 2d 736 (1940).
17. Whitehead v. Allen, 63 N. M. 63, 313 P. 2d 335 (1957).
18. 166 S. C. 454, 165 S. E. 203, 84 A. L. R. 1336 (1932).
[Vol. 10
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MISSISSIPPI. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has stated
the rule that punitive damages are recoverable for breach
of contract only if the breach is " . . . attended by some in-
tentional wrong, insult, abuse, or gross negligence, which
amounts to an independent tort."'19 This seems a broader
statement of the "independent tort" rule than in Texas. But
other than in cases involving common carriers, which proceed
on a tort theory, it has been applied in only one other case.
There the defendant was held liable in actual and punitive
damages for breaking plaintiff's fence in violation of a con-
tract, thus allowing his cows to stray.20 Although the case
could have been rationalized on the theory that breaking the
fence was a trespass, a tort, the Court treated it as an inde-
pendent tort accompanying the breach of contract and af-
firmed the earlier statement of the rule.
IOWA. In a recent Iowa case2 ' a tenant sued his landlord
for breach of contract, including breach of a covenant for
quiet enjoyment. The Court affirmed a verdict for plaintiff
for actual and punitive damages, stating the various excep-
tions to the general rule American courts have developed,
and seemed to rest its holding as to punitive damages on a
finding of oppression and malice on the landlord's part.
OTHERS. Three other states have dicta in recent cases
which strongly indicate that they would allow recovery of
punitive damages for breach of contract in proper cases, at
least where the breach amounts to an independent tort. They
are Missouri, 22 Florida,2 3 and Kansas.24 It is worthy of note
that the two Kansas cases are both against insurance com-
panies.
Most of these recent cases favoring allowance of punitive
damages in contract cases cite passages in treatises and en-
19. American Ry. Express Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 107 So. 761,
763 (1926). See Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664, L. R. A.
1916B 622, Ann. Cas. 1917E 410 (1915).
20. D. L. Fair Lumber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770,
151 A. L. R. 631 (1944).
21. Kuiken v. Garrett, 243 Iowa 785, 51 N. W. 2d 149, 41 A. L. R. 2d
1397 (1952).
22. Williams v. Kansas City Public Service Co., - Mo. -, 294 S. W.
2d 36 (1956).
23. Griffith v. Shamrock Village, 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957).
24. Moffet v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 52, 244
P. 2d 228 (1952); Mabery v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 173 Kan.
586, 250 P. 2d 824 (1952).
1958]
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cyclopedias which are largely based on South Carolina cases.
Many of them rely on the annotation of the Holland case.2 5
Thus, it appears that our peculiar rule has had some appre-
ciable effect on American law. And when the natural ten-
dency of dicta to become law is considered, it seems reason-
able that our heretofore unique doctrine will have further ef-
fect on the future development of the law in this area.
Let us now examine the South Carolina rule and see whence
it came and determine its present status.
II. THE RULE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. ITS ORIGIN AND HISTORY
The 1904 case of Welborn v. Dixon2 6 is the great-grand-
father of South Carolina's peculiar rule. The plaintiff had
deeded land to defendant by an instrument in form an abso-
lute conveyance but intended as a mortgage to secure a debt
of $385. Contemporaneously with the deed, the defendant
had agreed in a written contract to deed the land back to the
plaintiff upon payment of the $385. However, before the
time for reconveyance had expired, the defendant conveyed
the land away to a third party for $600. Plaintiff sued for
breach of contract, praying for $2,000 damages. Defendant's
demurrer to the complaint was overruled and the Supreme
Court affirmed, saying that defendant was guilty of an
equitable fraud, and holding, per Justice Gary :2
There are allegations also not only appropriate to an
ordinary action for damages arising ex contractu, but
showing that the breach of contract was accompanied
by a fraudulent act.... There is no doubt as to the gen-
eral principle, that in an action for breach of contract
the motives of the wrongdoer are not to be considered in
estimating the amount of damages, and that he is only
liable for such damages as are the natural and proximate
result of the wrongful act. When, however, the breach
of the contract is accompanied with a fraudulent act, the
rule is well settled, certainly in this State, that the de-
fendant may be made to respond in punitive as well as
compensatory damages.
25. 166 S. C. 454, 165 S. E. 203,84 A. L. R. 1336 (1932).
26. 70 S. C. 108, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Ann. Cas. 407 (1904).
27. Id. at 115.
448 [Vol. 10
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In support of his holding the Court quoted from Sedgwick on
Damages and relied as precedent on the old case of Rose &
Rodgers v. Beattie25 in which Judge Nott had said that in
cases of fraud, the jury could give vindictive damages, or
"imaginary damages" as he quaintly termed them, even though
the action was in assumpsit. The reasons for the Court's de-
cision were, in substance, that the fraudulent act amounted
to a tort for which exemplary damages could be recovered
in a tort action because of its malicious and fraudulent nature,
and that to prevent plaintiff from recovering them merely
because his suit was on the contract would be to give effect
to the common law forms of action abolished by the Code of
1870.29
Justice Woods in dissent in the Welborn case pointed out
that Judge Nott's statements in the older cases30 were mere
dicta, and that to allow punitive damages in this case would
surely result in " . . . disastrous uncertainty in the adminis-
tration of the law of contracts .... ,,31 The justice also felt
that a wilful and fraudulent refusal to pay a debt would re-
sult in punitive damages under the view of the majority of
the Court, a result which the later cases have not reached.
The doctrine of the Welborn case did not immediately spring
to life but lay almost dormant for thirty years or so. In the
next case involving the rule, a 1907 insurance case, recovery
of punitive damages was denied because no fraudulent act
had been pleaded.32 The same reason was given for denying
recovery in a 1912 case against an electric power company.3
In a 1913 case the act allegedly fraudulent was refusal to
28. 2 Nott & MeCord 538 (S. C. 1820).
29. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §10-8. One form of action
established. "There shall be in this State but one form of action for the
enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress of private
wrongs which shall be denominated a civil action."
30. Rose & Rodgers v. Beattie, note 28 supra; Farrand v. Bouchell,
Harper 83 (S. C. 1823).
31. Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 122, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Ann. Cas.
407 (1904).
32. Prince v. State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 77 S. C. 187, 57 S. E. 766
(1907). The complaint alleged that defendant breached its contract to
deliver a ten year life insurance policy but instead tried to compel plain-
tiff to accept another policy by threatening him with imprisonment.
The Court said: "As no fraudulent act is here alleged, exemplary dam-
ages cannot be recovered." 77 S. C. at 193.
33. Givens v. North Augusta Electric and Improvement Co., 91 S. C.
417, 74 S. E. 1067 (1912). The suit was for breach of a contract to fur-
nish electricity which plaintiff alleged had been wilfully and wantonly
breached. The Court said (91 S. C. at 424) that this was not an allega-
tion of fraud, hence punitive damages were not recoverable.
19581
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furnish promised money; recovery of punitive damages was
denied because no fraudulent act had been pleaded nor
proved.3 4 The first case after the Welborn case to allow re-
covery of punitive damages was a 1918 suit against a tele-
graph company which was really based on the breach of duty
of a common carrier, which is a tort. 5 The first case pro-
ceeding on a contractual theory to allow recovery of punitive
damages was a 1921 case in which a landowner breached a
sharecropper's contract by running him off after the crop had
been laid by and seizing his half of the crop.36 A 1923 case,
scantily reported,37 and since overruled,38 allowed punitive
damages apparently for a fraudulent breach of warranty.
The rule did not become really firmly established in our
law until the Court was presented with a series of suits on
insurance contracts alleged to have been breached accompa-
nied by fraudulent acts, beginning in the Depression and con-
tinuing to the present time. The Williams case3 9 was the first
in which punitive damages were assessed against an insurance
company,4 ° but it was a tort action for fraud and deceit. It
is somewhat surprising to learn that the first insurance case
allowing recovery of punitive damages for a breach accom-
panied by a fraudulent act was as late as 1931, a case in
34. Donaldson v. Temple, 96 S. C. 240, 80 S. E. 437 (1913). Although
it does not appear in the majority opinion what the alleged fraudulent
act was, it appears from the dissent (96 S. C. at 244) that it was the
neglect and refusal to furnish money as contracted.
35. Reaves v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 110 S. C. 233, 96 S. E.
295 (1918) (reckless delay in transmitting telegraphed money).
36. Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S. C. 137, 108 S. E. 189 (1921).
37. Huffman v. Moore, 122 S. C. 220, 115 S. E. 634 (1923).
38. See Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166 S. C. 454,
468, 165 S. E. 203, 84 A. L. R. 1336 (1932).
39. Williams v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 159 S. C. 301, 156 S. E.
871 (1931). Defendant's agent had changed the words "sample copy"
on the policy to "1928 Cereal copy" and sold it to a plaintiff even more
illiterate than himself. Plaintiff recovered $1000 actual and punitive
damages in a tort action for fraud and deceit. Defendant appealed only
on a point of agency law and lost. On principles of agency law, the
principal will be liable in punitive damages for a fraudulent act of his
agent accompanying a breach of contract if the fraudulent act was done
"'in the course of the agency and by virtue of the authority as agent,'"
Williams v. Ins. Co., supra; but the principal will not be so liable if the
fraudulent act was outside the scope of the agency, even though it was
a gross fraud. Rast v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 190 S. C. 201, 2 S. E.
2d 400 (1939) (agent had no authority to bind the company to a par-
ticular construction of the policy terms). For a recent agency case, see
Taylor v. U. S. Casualty Co., 229 S. C. 230, 92 S. E. 2d 647 (1956), in-
volving an alleged fraudulent breach of an "assigned risk" auto liability
insurance policy.
40. Howser, supra note 3, at 151.
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which an insurance agent obtained possession of a policy and
premium receipt book from plaintiff by fraudulent represen-
tations and the company denied liability under the policy and
retained possession of the papers; a verdict for plaintiff of
$186 actual and $2,000 punitive damages was affirmed.
41
In 1932 the Court handed down three opinions involving
fraudulent breach of insurance contracts and one involving
an employment contract.42 At about that time the rule in
South Carolina began giving concern to insurance companies,
for in 1932 a leading insurance counsel indicated as much in
a speech in Toronto, Canada.43 In the years immediately fol-
lowing, the Court was almost engulfed with a deluge of cases
involving fraudulent breaches. For example, in the year 1935
there were no less than ten cases in the Supreme Court on
that theory, not counting the cases proceeding on the older
theory of fraud and deceit. The number of cases was at a
peak during the Depression years, but even so, there are at
least three or four cases on the point in the Supreme Court
every year up to the present.
For the past twenty-five years or so one could probably
draw a very close correlation between the health of South
Carolina's economy and the number of cases in the Supreme
Court which proceed on the theory that a contract, usually an
insurance policy, has been breached accompanied by a fraud-
ulent act.
Having thus traced the history of the rule, let us now ex-
amine it to see exactly what the correct statement of the rule
is and what the requisite elements for recovery of punitive
damages are.
B. VARIANT STATEMENTS OF THE RULE
The South Carolina rule has been stated in several different
ways in its fifty-year existence. Some of these variants are
41. Bradley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 S. C. 303, 160 S. E.
721 (1931).
42. Insurance:
McLoud v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 167 S. C. 309, 166 S. E. 343
(1932) ; Wilkes v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 166 S. C. 475, 165 S. E. 188
(1932); Derrick v. North Carolina Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 S. C. 434,
166 S. E. 502 (1932).
Employment:
Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., note 38 supra.
43. P. M. Estes, general counsel of the Life and Casualty Insurance
Company of Tennessee. See Proceedings of the Legal Section, American
Life Convention (1932), p. 169.
1958]
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mere verbal variations while others would make substantial
changes in the law if literally applied.
1. "Fraudulent Act"
In the leading case Justice Gary said that the breach there
was accompanied by a fraudulent act and stated the rule to
be that the defendant was liable in punitive as well as com-
pensatory damages when the breach was "accompanied with
a fraudulent act."'4 4 When the preposition "with" is changed
to "by", this is believed the orthodox statement of the rule
and is preferable to the others because it is more concise and
contains all the elements which later cases have held essential.
2. "Fraudulent Intent"
The first heresy to rear its head came eight years later in
the Givens case45 in which Justice Hydrick said that punitive
damages were recoverable when " . . . the breach is accom-
panied by an intent to defraud the other party to the con-
tract."48 This statement, if followed, would have made a
fundamental change in the doctrine. Later cases, however,
have said that no matter how malicious or fraudulent the
intent with which the breach is accomplished, punitive dam-
ages are recoverable only if the requisite fraudulent act is
present. A wilful or deliberate violation of a contract alone
is not sufficient.4 7 A breach accomplished with a fraudulent
44. Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 115, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Ann. Cas. 407
(1904).
45. Givens v. North Augusta Electric & Improvement Co., 91 S. C.
417,74 S. E. 1067 (1912).
46. Id., 91 S. C. at 424.
47. In Collopy v. Citizens Bank of Darlington, 223 S. C. 493, 77 S. E.
2d 215 (1953), the complaint alleged that plaintiff notified defendant
that plaintiff was the true owner of funds which plaintiff's agent had
deposited with defendant bank, and that defendant refused to allow
plaintiff to prove his title and paid the balance over to the agent who
absconded. On motion to strike allegations as to punitive damages, the
Court held they were not recoverable, since plaintiff's cause of action
was co contractu, since no fraud of defendant was alleged, and since a
wilful breach of contract did not give rise to a liability for punitive
damages.
In Lamb v. Metropolitan Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 345, 191
S. E. 56 (1937), a suit on a fire insurance policy, plaintiff demanded
punitive damages (in second cause of action), alleging that at the time
the contract was made, defendant expressly waived any question as to
the status of furniture and fixtures which plaintiff held under title
retention contracts and that after loss, defendant disclaimed liability
on grounds they were encumbered with mortgages. A demurrer as to
punitive damages was sustained, for "[n] o amount of wilfulness or de-
liberateness in the breach of a contract will warrant punitive damages."
183 S. C. at 349.
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intent (without a fraudulent act) is not sufficient.48 It has
been said that" . . . proof of the mere violation of a contract
will not support an allegation of fraud . . . 19 and even that
the breach is not of itself evidence of fraud.50 However,
Justice Hydrick undertook to correct his error by writing a
special concurring opinion the next year :51
Instead of saying that such damages [punitive] are not
recoverable, except where the breach is accompanied by
a fraudulent intent, I should have said, except where the
breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act, resulting in
damage to the other party to the contract, which is as
far as any of our cases have gone....
3. "Cause of Action for Fraud"
The next variation in the rule came in another opinion
by Justice Hydrick in which he said that "... punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable for the mere breach of a private con-
tract, in the absence of circumstances giving rise to a cause
of action for fraud." 52 This statement has been cited and
quoted in at least three cases, but it has not gained accept-
ance as the general and orthodox statement of the rule. It
will be discussed more fully in a later section of this note53
In Bennett v. Dodge Bros. Corp., 169 S. C. 389, 169 S. E. 80 (1933),
the suit was for breach of a contract to repurchase repair parts on hand
upon cancellation by defendant of plaintiff's auto sales agency franchise,
the breach allegedly being wilful, wanton and with intent to defraud.
The default judgment was reversed as to punitive damages, for there
was no allegation of an act of fraud.
48. In Branham v. Wilson Motor Co., 188 S. C. 1, 198 S. E. 417 (1938),
the complaint alleged that at the time plaintiff bought a used car, as
an inducement, defendant agreed to insure it against fire, theft and
collision out of a $43 payment, defendant at the time having no inten-
tion of carrying out the agreement; that defendant bought fire and theft
insurance for $7.02 but failed to buy collision insurance, retaining the
balance of the payment. The Court affirmed striking out of allegations
as to punitive damages, saying that the fraudulent act of taking the
money did not accompany the breach, but rather accompanied the forma-
tion of the contract.
In Hall v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., 169 S. C. 384, 169 S. E. 78
(1933), a suit on a fire insurance policy on plaintiff's truck, the com-
plaint alleged that defendant agreed to settle for $85 plus payment of
a lien, but that with the intent to defraud plaintiff, defendant refused
to pay the agreed amount. Recovery of punitive damages was denied,
the Court saying that although defendant may have had intent to de-
fraud in the breach of contract, there was no fraudulent act on his part
as to the breach. 169 S. C. at 388.
49. Caldwell v. Duncan, 87 S. C. 331, 339, 69 S. E. 660 (1910).
50. Coleman v. Stevens, 124 S. C. 8, 15, 117 S. E. 305 (1923).
51. Donaldson v. Temple, 96 S. C. 240, 243, 80 S. E. 437 (1913).
52. Reaves v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 110 S. C. 233, 238, 96
S. E. 295 (1918).
53. See pages 476-482 infra.
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which will attempt to show that it is a valid statement of the
rule only if it includes both legal and equitable causes of
action for fraud.
4. "Fraudulent Intention Plus Fraudulent Act"
Chief Justice Blease stated the rule thusly: "To recover
damages of that character [punitive], the plaintiff must show
that the breach was accomplished with a fraudulent intention,
and was accompanied by a fraudulent act."5 4 This statement
has been quoted in several later cases. If saying that an act
was fraudulent implies that the actor had a fraudulent inten-
tion, this form of the rule adds no new requirement to the
orthodox statement by Justice Gary, but it does focus atten-
tion on the element of intent, which is a necessary element of
fraud, and is valuable for that reason.
5. "Fraudulent Breach of Contract Is a Tort"
The statement of the rule which has given rise to most diffi-
culty originated in the Dyson case" in which the Court on
appeal adopted the statement of the trial judge that " . . . a
fraudulent breach of contract is a tort." The expression
"fraudulent breach of contract" is common in the cases as
apparently synonymous with "breach of contract accompanied
by a fraudulent act," but the statement that this action is a
tort was novel in the Dyson case.
Several later cases have quoted the statement. In the Broome
case"' the Court said: "Whether such holding is in conflict
with expressions used by the court in some of its prior deci-
sions is not here important." But later in the Bourne case57
it was important. An administrator, deceased, had forged cer-
tain checks and misappropriated estate assets. Suit was
brought against his personal representative (administratrix)
within less than one year from his death. His administratrix
demurred to the complaint on grounds that the suit was for
a debt, hence could not be maintained against her in her
54. Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 S. C. 448, 462, 176
S. E. 340 (1934).
55. Dyson v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 176 S. C. 411, 415, 180 S. E.
475 (1935).
56. Broome v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 413, 418, 191 S. E. 220
(1937).
57. Bourne v. Maryland Casualty Co., 185 S. C. 1. 192 S. E. 605, 118
A. L. R. 1 (1937).
[Vol. 10
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official capacity. 572 The Court, however, in affirming the
overruling of the demurrer said that the cause of action was
one for fraudulent breach of contract, which is a tort, and
therefore could be maintained before the year had passed. In
the Babb case 5s three of defendant's four exceptions chal-
lenged the correctness of the rule that a fraudulent breach of
contract is a tort, but the Court found the question imma-
terial and declined to pass on it.
It is obvious that an action for fraudulent breach of con-
tract (or, synonymously, for breach of contract accompanied
by a fraudulent act) partakes of elements of both contract and
tort. To say that an action for fraudulent breach of contract
is a tort is to say that the fraud is the essence of the thing,
and that the breach of contract is merely incidental thereto as
a convenient measure of actual damages. One can imagine
several situations besides that in the Bourne case5 9 in which
it makes a difference whether an action for fraudulent breach
of contract is classified as an action in tort or in contract.
The Court has passed on at least four of these situations
and has held: 1)Where a breach of contract only is proved,
but no fraudulent act, the plaintiff can recover actual dam-
ages for the breach of contract but no punitive damages. 60
2) In a fraudulent breach action, there must be proof of ac-
tual damages, or at least of nominal actual damages, to sup-
port a verdict awarding punitive damages. 60 ' 3) If the plain-
57a. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §19-554. "No action shall
be commenced against any executor or administrator for the recovery
of debts due by the testator or intestate until twelve months after such
testator's or intestate's death." (See 1956 amendment and change of this
section.)
58. Babb v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 S. C. 1, 77 S. E. 2d 267
(1953).
59. Note 57 sulra.
60. Broome v. Travelers Ins. Co, 183 S. C. 413, 191 S. E. 220 (1937).
60a. Monroe v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., Westbrook's Adv. Ops.,
Feb. 22, 1958, in which the Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict of
no actual damages and $2890 punitive damages ($100 less than prayer
of complaint) and entered judgment for defendant, quoting from Cook
v. A. C. L. RR, 183 S. C. 279, 281, 190 S. E. 923, 924 (1937), a negli-
gence case: "Exemplary damages do not and cannot exist as an inde-
pendent cause of action, but such damages are mere incidents to the
cause of action and can never constitute the basis thereof. If the injured
party has no cause of action independent of a supposed right to recover
exemplary damages, then he has no cause of action at all; consequently,
there must be allegations of actual or nominal damages in the pleadings
and a proof thereof in the trial of the cause in order to support a ver-
dict for punitive damages alone." See also Barnes v. Industrial Life &
Health Ins. Co., 201 S. C. 188, 22 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).
1958]
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tiff first brings suit for breach of contract, seeking only ac-
tual damages, and loses, he cannot seek actual and punitive
damages in a second suit for breach of contract accompanied
by a fraudulent act; there is identity of subject matter de-
spite the asserted claim of fraud in the second suit; hence
the bar of res judicata is complete.' 1 4) The burden of proof
of fraud is by evidence which is clear, cogent and convincing. 2
In two recent cases, Cain v. United Ins. Co.63 and Ross v.
American Income Life Ins. Co.,64 the Court said that an action
61. Smith v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 201 S. C. 291, 22 S. E. 2d
885 (1942) ; Glenn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 316, 24 S. E.
2d 609 (1943).
62. See Holder v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 180 S. C. 242, 247, 185
S. E. 547 (1936), an action for fraudulent cancellation of an insurance
policy. However, in such a case a jury question as to punitive damages
is presented if there is a scintilla of evidence tending to show a breach
of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act; a directed verdict for
defendant is proper only if the court can conclude, as a matter of law,
that the evidence in the case excludes all reasonable inferences of fraud.
Calder v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 182 S. C. 240, 245, 188 S. E 864
(1936). But a jury verdict as to a fraudulent act cannot be based on con-
jecture. Snellgrove v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 176 S. C. 178, 179 S. E. 784
(1935).
63. Westbrook's Adv. Ops., March 8, 1958. Plaintiff, beneficiary of
a policy on her husband's life, recovered a verdict of $240 actual
and $1,750 punitive damages for fraudulent breach of the contract.
The trial court granted judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto
on grounds that the policy was obtained by false representations made
by the insured in the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, per
Mr. Justice Oxner:
It follows from the foregoing that the cause of action for
fraudulent breach of contract, which is regarded under our de-
cisions as an action ex contractu, Broome vs. Travelers Insurance
Co., 183 S. C. 413, 191 S. E. 220, must fail. Cp. Babb vs. Paul
Revere Life Insurance Co., 224 S. C. 1, 77 S. E. (2d) 267. To
sustain such a cause of action it is essential that there be a
valid contract. Since the insurance policy upon which this action
is based was procured by fraud, plaintiff can have no cause of
action for the breach of it.
The Court said further that even if the fraudulent acts alleged to
have accompanied the breach were proved, they " . . . would not
vitalize the insurance contract or be of any aid in establishing a
cause of action for the breach of it."
64. Westbrook's Adv. Ops., March 15, 1958. Plaintiff took out an
accident and health insurance policy by mail in 1948 which was al-
legedly wrongfully cancelled in 1955. Plaintiff sued the two foreign
insurance corporations (his original insurer and its re-insurer) in
two separate actions: 1) for fraudulent breach of the contract and
2) for fraud and deceit inducing him to enter the contract. Service
of process was made on the State Insurance Commissioner pursuant
to the Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act, CODE Or LAWS OF Soum
CAROLINA, 1952 § 37-265. Defendants' motion to vacate and set aside
the service was denied.
In a consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order as
to the action for fraudulent breach but reversed as to that for fraud
and deceit, holding: 1) The statute is constitutional; 2) The issuance
and delivery by mail of a single policy is sufficient to sustain service
13
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for fraudulent breach of contract is one ex contractu, not ex
delicto.65 The language in these cases seems an attempt by the
Court to lay to rest the Dyson case66 dictum that the action is
in tort.
But problems remain in this shadowy borderland between
tort and contract, the chief one being that of survival of the
action. It is clear that after the death of the insured, the bene-
ficiary may sue for a fraudulent breach of an insurance
policy which was accomplished during the life of the insured
67
and may recover both actual and punitive damages. 68 If a
cause of action for fraudulent breach of contract is one ex
contractu, as the recent cases indicate, it is hard to see why
it would not survive in favor of the personal representative of
the insured; but the Court has held, seemingly, that it does
not so survive.69
Even if the action were held to survive, there is still the
question of damages: could the personal representative re-
cover only actual damages or could he recover punitive dam-
ages also? In case of conflict between the insured's personal
representative and the beneficiary, would there be a race to
under the statute-a showing of other transactions is not required;
3) Actions for fraudulent breach of insurance contracts are "actions
or suits arising out of such policy or contract" within the meaning
of the statute, but actions for fraud and deceit inducing an insured
to enter such a contract are not within the provisions of such statute.
Apparently, this is the first case in the state courts construing
this section of the statute, which was passed in 1947.
65. In Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., note 64 supra, the
Court per Mr. Justice Oxner said: "At the outset it may be stated
that appellants are in error in stating that a cause of action for
fraudulent breach of a contract is one ex delicto. Such an action is
regarded under our decisions as ex contractu."
66. Dyson v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., note 55 supra.
67. Babb v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 S. C. 1, 77 S. E. 2d 267
(1953). However, a suit for a fraudulent breach of contract brought
by a beneficiary under a policy which reserves a right in the insured
to change the beneficiary is prematurely brought if brought in the
life of the insured. Shuler v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 184
S. C. 485, 193 S. E. 46 (1937).
68. See Myers v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 170 S. C. 80,
169 S. E. 676 (1933).
69. Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S. C. 256, 15
S. E. 2d 117 (1941). Plaintiff joined two causes of action in her com-
plaint: 1) for $308 actual damages due her as beneficiary; 2) for
$1,500 actual and punitive damages due her as administratrix of her
husband for a fraudulent cancellation of a policy on his life. The
Court held that the second cause of action did not survive. The head-
note to the case designates the cause of action as one for fraud and
deceit, but from the allegations of the complaint, it appears to be a
fraudulent cancellation that was alleged. (197 S. C. at 259). The Court
in the body of its opinion did not characterize the action.
1958]
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss3/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
bring suit, so that the first one to serve the summons would
bar a suit by the other? Suppose the policy were payable to
the insured's estate. If there were a fraudulent cancellation,
could the personal representative recover punitive damages?
It is hard to see why a line should be drawn between a suit
by a beneficiary and by the insured's personal representative
in such a case. These questions have not yet come before the
Court.
III. ELEMENTS OF THE ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT
BREACH
Taking as our text the orthodox rule as laid down in Wel-
born v. Dixon, ° let us analyze it in terms of the decisions to
determine what elements are necessary before a plaintiff in
South Carolina can recover punitive damages for breach of
contract. That rule is that punitive damages are recoverable
if, but only if, the breach of contract is accompanied by a
fraudulent act.
A. THE BREACH OF CONTRACT
It is obvious that there must be a breach of the contract
before any damages can be recovered, a fortiori before puni-
tive damages for a fraudulent act accompanying the breach
can be recovered. Therefore, if the contract is still in force
and has not been breached at the time the suit is brought, that
is, at the time the summons is served, no damages can be
recovered. Thus, where an insurance policy was in force until
February 22 and suit on it was brought on February 20, the
Court held that a nonsuit had properly been granted, stating
that plaintiff would have had a good cause of action for
fraudulent breach of contract if she (her attorney) had
waited patiently a few more days to sue.
71
The difficult question is what is effectual as a breach. It
has been held that cancellation of an insurance policy at-
tempted by the insurer at a time when the premiums are paid
up is ineffectual to breach the policy, 72 unless the insurer
70. 70 S. C. 108, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Ann. Cas. 407 (1904).
71. Bailey v. North Carolina Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 S. C. 131, 175
S. E. 73 (1934).
72. Moore v. Standard Mutual Life Ass'n of S. C., 191 S. C. 196, 4
S. E. 2d 251 (1939). See also Herndon v. Continental Casualty Co., 144
S. C. 448, 142 S. E. 648 (1928).
[Vol. 10O
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tenders back the unearned premiums.1 3 Likewise it has been
held that cancellation attempted in a mode contrary to that
prescribed by the policy is ineffectual.7 4 But these cases have
been greatly weakened, if not overruled, by a recent case in
which lapse notices were sent to the insured, allegedly by mis-
take on the insurer's part, during the period for which the
premiums had been paid up, and the Court held that the policy
had been breached, affirming a verdict for plaintiff of $12
actual and $1,500 punitive damages.
7 5
One important rule in this area is that punitive damages
are not recoverable without proof of actual or at least nominal
damages.7 6 Since the claim for punitive damages is dependent
on that for actual damages, if a previous suit for breach of
contract sought only actual damages and resulted in judgment
for defendant, that judgment is a bar to a subsequent suit for
a breach of the contract accompanied by a fraudulent act
seeking both actual and punitive damages.7 7
B. ACCOMPANIED BY
The fraudulent act must accompany the breach and not be
too far separated from it in point of time. If the fraudulent
acts and representations are solely in the inception of the con-
tract and none accompany the breach, punitive damages can-
not be recovered in a suit for fraudulent breach of contract,
and allegations of fraud may properly be stricken.7  The
Court has said that representations made in June 1939, when
a contract was made, could not be said to accompany the
73. Kelly v. Guaranty Fire Ins. Co., 176 S. C. 275, 180 S. E. 35
(1935).
74. Cunningham v. Independence Ins. Co., 182 S. C. 520, 189 S. E. 800
(1937).
75. Davis v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 227 S. C. 587, 88 S. E. 2d
658 (1955).
76. Monroe v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., Westbrook's Adv. Ops.,
Feb. 22, 1958; Barnes v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 201 S. C.
188, 22 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).
77. Glenn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 316, 24 S. E. 2d
609 (1943); Smith v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 201 S. C. 291, 22
S. E. 2d 885 (1942).
78. Branham v. Wilson Motor Co., note 48 supra. In Lilienthal v.
S. C. Public Service Co., 174 S. C. 177, 177 S. E. 98 (1934), the complaint
alleged that defendant sold plaintiff corporate securities by fraudulently
representing that they constituted a first mortgage on his plant and
by promising to refund the purchase price upon request. In a suit
for breach of the contract to refund, allegations as to punitive damages
were stricken from the complaint, for the false representations accom-
panied the making of the contract, not the breach. See also Lawson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 S. C. 540, 169 S. E. 430 (1933).
1958]
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alleged breach in October 1940.79 The proper remedy in such
case is an action in tort for fraud and deceit.79 a Cases have
been reversed because the two actions of fraud and deceit and
fraudulent breach were confused. One judge has stated:
"Punitive damages are recoverable for the fraudulent breach
of a contract accompanied by fraudulent acts in the making
of the contract as well as in the breach thereof."3 0 However,
this statement is believed a mere dictum, for in that case
fraudulent acts permeated the entire contract including the
breach, and later cases have clearly stated the requirement
that the fraudulent act accompany the breach.
It is clear that the fraudulent act may occur before the
breach. In the leading case it occurred about three months
before, and despite defendant's argument that the fraudulent
act did not accompany the breach, the Court affirmed a ver-
dict for plaintiff of punitive damages, stating :81
The Court does not so understand the legal phrase to
mean that the two acts, the act of breach and the act of
fraud, must be committed almost simultaneously .... We
know of no rule of law measuring in point of time this
distance. It simply means that the two must be co-exist-
79. McCullough v. The American Workmen, 200 S. C. 84, 20 S. E. 2d
640 (1942). The complaint alleged that plaintiff bought insurance from
defendant fraternal benefit association in reliance on statements in
the policy that the dues would never increase, that the dues were in-
creased, and that defendant brought about an unlawful cancellation
by refusing to accept the former dues. A verdict for plaintiff was re-
versed, the Court holding: 1) although plaintiff could have sued for
fraud and deceit inducing the contract, she had elected to sue for
fraudulent breach of contract, hence the judge erred in charging the
law of fraud and deceit; 2) since the action was one ex contractu, alle-
gations as to fraud in the inception of the contract were surplusage; 3)
since no fraudulent act in the breach of contract was proved, no puni-
tive damages could be recovered. Note that the Court goes so far as to
say, 200 S. C. at 91: "We hold that the plaintiff, having elected to sue
upon an alleged breach of the contract, was estopped from asserting an
action for fraud and deceit in its inception, that is, in its procure-
ment.... "
79a. Smyth v. Fleischmann, 214 S. C. 263, 52 S. E. 2d 199 (1949).
Complaint alleged that defendant induced plaintiff to accept employ-
ment in his bakery shop by promising her a higher salary and bonuses,
defendant never intending to execute his contract, and that defendant
discharged her within three weeks. The Court on appeal reversed an
order striking allegations as to fraud and punitive damages, holding
that the cause of action alleged was not one for breach of contract
accompanied by fraudulent acts but rather for fraud and deceit in in-
ducing a contract, and hence the allegations were appropriate.
80. Porter v. Mullins, 198 S. C. 325, 334, 17 S. E. 2d 684 (1941) (per
Gaston, A. A. J.).
81. Bradley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 S. C. 303, 318, 160 S. E.
721 (1931).
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ing, logically connected, and the one must be attendant
upon the other.
Of course, in many cases the breach and the fraudulent act
are one and the same. In one illustrative case the sending of
lapse notices was the breach and the fraudulent act as well.
8 2
In another, defendant's refusal to accept a premium payment
was both the fraudulent act and the breach.
3
May the fraudulent act occur after the breach? No South
Carolina case has been found in which this point was argued
or decided; but a Texas case8 4 has said that where the inde-
pendent tort occurred after the breach, plaintiff could not
recover punitive damages because it was not connnected with
the breach.
C. A FRAUDULENT ACT
The greatest difficulty in discussing the South Carolina
rule is to define what a fradulent act is, but there is no doubt
of the rule that in order for the plaintiff to recover punitive
damages, there must be a fraudulent act accompanying the
breach of contract.8 5 A breach of contract committed with
fraudulent intent, without a fraudulent act, is not sufficient.86
In one case the Court said :87 "A fraudulent act is of like char-
acter to a fradulent intention, but imports some definite act
looking to the perpetration of the fraud."
In order better to examine this requirement that there be
a fraudulent act, we can break it down into its two compon-
ents: a) an act b) which is fraudulent. First, let us examine
the requirement of an act.
a. An Act.
In a recent case the Court affirmed and quoted a county
judge's instruction to the jury that even though the defendant
had cancelled an insurance policy with the intent of de-
frauding the plaintiff, the jury could assess punitive dam-
ages only if they found there was "' . . . some positive,
82. Davis v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 227 S. C. 587, 88 S. E. 2d
658 (1955).
83. Davis v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 195 S. C. 406, 11 S. E. 2d 433 (1940).
84. See Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 170 S. W. 1062, 1066 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914).
85. See, e. g., Lamb v. Metropolitan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 345,
191 S. E. 56 (1937); Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166
S. C. 454, 165 S. E. 203, 84 A. L. R. 1336 (1932).
86. See, e. g., the cases cited in note 48 supra.
87. Hardee v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 215 S. C. 1, 11, 53 S. E. 2d
861 (1949) (Baker, Ch. J.).
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affirmative, overt act evidencing fraud...'" accompanying
the breach but separate and distinct from it.88 There is noth-
ing strange or peculiar in the rule that fraud requires an act.
The general rule applicable to all types of fraud, regardless
of the remedy sought therefor, is that there is no actionable
fraud without some act, and, according to some authority,89
without some overt act. Without some act there is no action-
able fraud, regardless of whether the remedy sought for the
fraud is an action at law for damages for fraud and deceit,90
or a suit in equity to rescind a contract,91 or whether the
fraud is asserted defensively.92 Actionable fraud consists of
two elements: 1) an intention to deceive, and 2) some act
executing the intention.93 An unexecuted purpose to defraud
another cannot be actionable because such an unexecuted pur-
pose can work no injury.94 In the usual case of fraud, an
action at law in tort for fraud and deceit, the act is the rep-
resentation which usually consists of words; however, it may
be accomplished by deeds as well.95
Although the cases say that some fraudulent act must ac-
company the breach of contract before the defendant will be
liable in punitive damages, it seems to state the rule too
broadly to say that some positive, affirmative, overt act is
required. 0 For, where there is a duty to speak, silence may
be fraud; non-disclosure of a material fact is actual fraud
where there is a duty to disclose it.97 And, even where there
is no duty to speak, if one does speak, he thereby assumes a
duty not to mislead his hearer and thereby becomes liable
for deceit if his representation is false.97 And we shall see
88. Davis v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 227 S. C. 587, 592, 88 S. E. 2d
658 (1955) (J. McGowan of Greenville County Court).
89. 23 Aii. JuR., Fraud and Deceit § 21.
90. Costello v. Barnard, 190 Mass. 260, 76 N. E. 599, 112 Am. St. Rep.
328, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 212 (1906).
91. Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573, 10 N. W. 900,
42 Am. Rep. 53 (1881).
92. Keller v. Johnson, 11 Ind. 337, 71 Am. Dec. 355 (1858).
93. People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67, 59 Am. Dec. 451 (1853).
94. Note 91 supra.
95. Chisolm v. Gadsden, 1 Strob. 220, 47 Am. Dec. 550 (S. C. 1847).
96. See notes 88 and 89 supra.
97. See Gardner v. Nash, 225 S. C. 303, 309, 82 S. E. 2d 123 (1954);
Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S. C. 427, 436, 23 S. E. 2d 372
(1942). Both cases are suits in equity, however; the first to set aside
a sale, the second for specific performance of a contract to convey land
in which fraud was a defense.
97a. In Lawlor v. Scheper, 232 S. C. 94, 101 S. E. 2d 269 (1957),
an action by a buyer of real estate against a seller and his agents for
fraud and deceit, agents of the defendant seller represented to plaintiff
462 [Vol. 10
19
Summerall: Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
LAW NOTES
that the fraudulent act need not be a positive, affirmative
act to make the defendant liable for punitive damages; a
fraudulent omission may likewise make him liable therefor. 8
Therefore, perhaps it would state the rule more accurately to
say that punitive damages are recoverable for a breach of
contract when the breach is accompanied by some fraudulent
conduct.
b. Which is fraudulent.
The crux of the matter is the requirement that the act (or
conduct) be fraudulent. What qualities of an act make it
fraudulent?
The Court has never attempted an inclusive definition of
fraud, largely because of the amorphous quality of the con-
cept. However, the Court has quoted this statement several
times :99
Fraud assumes so many hues and forms that Courts are
compelled to content themselves with comparatively few
general rules for its discovery and defeat, and allow the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case to bear
heavily upon the conscience and judgment of the Court or
jury in determining its presence or absence. While it has
often been said that fraud cannot be precisely defined,
the books contain many definitions, such as unfair deal-
ing; the unlawful appropriation of another's property
by design....
It is clear, however, that the intent of the actor to deceive
is the essential element making his act fraudulent. "It is a
state of mind, dependent on intent, which is provable by cir-
cumstantial evidence."' 100 It is evidence or inference of an
encompassing fraudulent design, of unfair dealing, that the
Court looks for in these cases. For example, where a plaintiff
has paid ten cents a week for twenty years on a life and health
policy with $2 a week health benefits and a $20 death benefit,
buyer that the total amount due on two mortgages was $10,150. De-
fendants were held liable in actual damages for deceit when it later
developed that the total due was actually $676.20 more than represented.
The Court said: "It may be true, as counsel argue, that appellants owed
no duty to furnish any information as to the amounts owing on the
two mortgages but when they undertook to do so, they owed a duty not
to mislead respondent." 101 S. E. 2d at 271.
98. See pages 469-473, 479-482 infra.
99. 12 R. C. L., Fraud and Deceit § 2.
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making regular payments at her home to defendant's agent,
and the agent quit coming after plaintiff filed a claim for
sick benefits, causing the policy to lapse because plaintiff did
not know where defendant's office was located, the Court was
quick to affirm an award of punitive damages. 10 1 But con-
versely, in a similar situation, where the agent's custom was
to collect premiums from the insured at work and the insured
had changed jobs, if the agent makes repeated unsuccessful
efforts to collect the premiums and in fact makes collections
after he knows the insured had been hospitalized, there will
be no inference of fraud.10 2 Another factor the Court con-
siders is whether the company or the agent will profit from
the lapse.' 03 Oftimes a web of circumstances unexplained by
the insurer will warrant an inference of fraud, even though
each act considered separately would not show bad faith. 0 4
"Fraud may be deduced not only from deceptive or false rep-
resentations, but from facts, incidents, and circumstances
which may be trivial in themselves, but decisive in a given
case of the fraudulent design."'
0 5
However, the Court has held two classes of acts not fraudu-
lent. First, the retention of money due under a contract can-
not be a fraudulent act, under our cases. In the leading case,
plaintiff suing for breach of an employment contract con-
tended that by failing to pay him the promised salary, de-
fendant had appropriated plaintiff's property to his own use.
The Court rejected this argument, saying that no implication
of fraud arose from an unpaid debt. 0 The Court has re-
101. Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 227 S. C. 239, 87
S. E. 2d 685 (1955).
102. Register v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 213 S. C. 508, 50 S. E. 2d 197
(1948). For a factually complicated case in which the jury found fraud
but in which the court found no fraudulent design, see Welch v. Missouri
State Life Ins. Co., 176 S. C. 494, 180 S. E. 447 (1935).
103. See Blackmon v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 229 S. C.
54, 91 S. E. 2d 709 (1956) ; Collopy v. Citizens Bank of Darlington, 223
S. C. 493, 77 S. E. 2d 215 (1953); Pack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
178 S. C. 272, 182 S. E. 747 (1935).
104. Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 225 S. C. 236, 81 S. E. 2d
359 (1954).
105. Cook v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 S. C. 77, 84, 194 S. E.
636 (1938).
106. Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166 S. C. 454, 165
S. E. 203, 84 A. L. R. 1336 (1932). The complaint alleged that plaintiff
had sold his stock in the defendant newspaper company to one LaVarre
in consideration, in part, of the continuance of his employment as busi-
ness manager for three years; that when LaVarre sold out to the pres-
ent owners, the board of directors ratified the contract; that defendant
then discharged plaintiff without notice, with fraudulent and malicious
[Vol. 10
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affirmed this holding, stating that ".... punitive damages are
not recoverable for the mere failure or refusal to pay a
debt."-10 7 Retaining money in violation of a promise to return
it is not a conversion but a mere breach of contract, unaccom-
panied by any fraudulent act.10 8 But it is fraud to receive
money for some particular purpose and to divert it to some
other purpose and actually to convert it to one's own use.'0 9
Undoubtedly, the mere failure or refusal to pay the amount
due under an insurance policy, no matter how willful or de-
liberate, is not a fraudulent act, standing alone." 0
Second, an act done with a bona fide belief in one's right
so to act is not fraudulent,"' even though a court later holds
he did not have the legal right to act as he did." 2 This is
intent to injure him in his livelihood, and appropriated to itself the
money due plaintiff.
The Court affirmed striking of allegations as to punitive damages,
saying, 166 S. C. at 468: "In his attempt to bring himself within this
rule [punitive damages for fraudulent act], the plaintiff says that the
defendant has appropriated to itself the salary which the plaintiff would
have earned and that this was a fraudulent act. We cannot adopt this
view. To do so would be equivalent to saying that every unpaid debt
carries with it the implication of fraud on the part of the debtor; that
the debtor has converted to his own use the money of another or that
he has misappropriated that which was always his own."
See note 163 post for discussion of punitive damages for breach of
employment contracts.
107. Patterson v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 228 S. C. 297, 299,
89 S. E. 2d 723 (1955). Also see e. g., Hall v. General Exchange Ins.
Corp., 169 S. C. 384, 169 S. E. 78 (1933).
108. Ray v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 206 S. C. 344, 34 S. E. 2d
218 (1945). Plaintiff applied for an insurance policy and deposited
$5 with defendant's agent; then she decided not to take the policy; the
agent promised to refund the money but did not tender it until nearly
three months later.
109. See Baker Wholesale Co. v. Fleming, 227 S. C. 312, 316, 87 S. E.
2d 876 (1955); National Bank v. Jennings, 38 S. C. 372, 377, 17 S. E.
16 (1893).
110. Owens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 S. C. 105, 182 S. E. 322
(1935); Hall v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., 169 S. C. 384, 169 S. E.
78 (1933). See also: Patterson v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 228
S. C. 297, 89 S. E. 2d 723 (1955); Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Cas-
ualty Co., 225 S. C. 236, 81 S. E. 2d 359 (1954); Lamb v. Metropolitan
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 345, 191 S. E. 56 (1937). Neither can
plaintiff succeed in recovering punitive damages for such an alleged
fraudulent act in a tort suit for fraud and deceit. Banahan v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 214 S. C. 403, 52 S. E. 2d 809 (1949).
111. Jordan v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 170 S. C. 19, 169
S. E. 673 (1933).
112. Hardee v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 215 S. C. 1, 53 S. E. 2d 861
(1949). A fortiori it would seem that action entirely within one's legal
rights is not fraudulent. One alleged fraudulent act accompanying
breach of the insurance agent's agency contract in Monroe v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., Westbrook's Adv. Ops., Feb. 22, 1958, was the
withholding of commissions due her. However, the contract provided that
either party could terminate it without cause by giving notice. The Court
19581
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because fraud depends upon intent to deceive. Thus, where
an insurer cancelled an accident insurance policy, believing
in good faith that acceptance of renewal premiums was op-
tional with the company under the terms of the policy, its
act was not fraudulent, despite the later holding by the Su-
preme Court that the policy was non-cancellable and continu-
ous because of an ambiguity in its terms.113
Since it is well nigh impossible to state a valid general rule
as to what are fraudulent acts, the best approach to the prob-
lem is to see what particular acts have been found fraudulent
in the cases. Indeed, there have been so many cases in this
state holding various acts accompanying breaches of con-
tracts fraudulent that it almost approaches a matter of inclu-
sion and exclusion. Several distinct patterns have emerged, and
plaintiffs understandably attempt to fit their cases into one or
more of these. In the following classification, it is assumed
that the fraudulent intent is present; the cases illustrate the
variety of acts in which such fraud has been expressed. It
should be remembered that the cases cited, unless otherwise
stated, proceed on the theory of breach of contract accompa-
nied by a fraudulent act, and that many other cases in tort for
fraud and deceit have allowed punitive damages for a variety
of fraudulent representations.
For the sake of convenience and analysis, the South Caro-
lina cases in which punitive damages have been allowed for
some fraudulent act accompanying the breach of contract can
be classified into three broad groups: 1) those in which fraud-
ulent representations together with some other act accom-
panied the breach; 2) those in which some fraudulent omis-
said: "This being true, it cannot reasonably be said that Appellant by
bringing about its termination breached its conditions fraudulently."
But see Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire Stores, 161
S. C. 4S7, 159 S. E. 825 (1931), noted adversely in 45 Harv. L. Rev. 378
(1931) and favorably in Cornell L. Q. 479 (1932), in which the contract
between plaintiff manufacturer of Philco radios and defendant jobber
provided that either party could terminate it "upon the giving of
written notice." In a suit on account after plaintiff's cancellation, de-
fendant counterclaimed for actual and punitive damages on grounds that
plaintiff had cancelled in pursuance of a fraudulent design. The over-
ruling of plaintiff's demurrer was affirmed on grounds that defendant
had stated some cause of action, since such an option to cancel a contract
will not be enforced if contrary to "equity and good conscience." Justice
Cothran vigorously dissented on grounds that action within one's legal
rights could not be a legal wrong.
113. Harwell v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn., 207 S. C.
150, 35 S. E. 2d 160, 161 A. L. R. 183 (1945).
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sion accompanied the breach; and 3) those in which various
other fraudulent acts accompanied the breach.
1. Misrepresentations and Affirmative Acts
a. Retention of policy or premium receipt book. One very
common fraudulent act in our cases has been the retention by
defendant insurance companies of policies and/or premium
receipt books obtained from the insured by fraudulent rep-
resentations of the insurance agent. In several cases the
agent acquired possession of such papers after death of the
insured upon a promise that the company would pay the face
value of the policy; when the company subsequently denied
liability and retained possession of the papers, refusing to re-
turn them or to pay anything, verdicts for punitive damages
have been affirmed." 4 In two other cases agents acquired
possession of policies by telling aged women they could not
get social security if they kept their insurance." 5 Another
company retained possession of a premium receipt book which
plaintiff customarily mailed in with each monthly payment." 6
Examples of other representations used to obtain possession
of such papers are: a promise to bring a substitute policy in
a few days'1 7 or to revive the policy," 8 or a representation
that the policy was lapsed and could not be revived 9 or that
the company had gone out of business making its policies
worthless when it had really been bought out by another
company.120
b. Substitution of policies or receipts. Fraudulent substitu-
tion of policies or receipts has been another fraudulent act of
insurance agents. In one case the agent obtained possession
of a straight life policy for $180 while the insured was sick
114. Henderson v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 199 S. C. 100, 18
S. E. 2d 605 (1942) ; Derrick v. N. C. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 S. C. 434,
166 S. E. 502 (1932); Bradley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 S. C.
303, 160 S. E. 721 (1931) ($2,000 punitive damages).
115. Neely v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 192 S. C. 71, 5 S. E.
2d 568 (1939). See Barnes v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 201
S. C. 188, 22 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).
116. See Calder v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 182 S. C. 240, 188
S. E. 864 (1936).
117. See Kelly v. Guaranty Fire Ins. Co., 176 S. C. 275, 180 S. E. 35
(1935).
118. See Walker v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 S. C. 387, 181 S. E. 463
(1935).
119. Weaver v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 197 S. C. 363, 15 S. E. 2d 673
(1941).
120. Williams v. United Ins. Co., 226 S. C. 574, 86 S. E. 2d 486 (1955)
(agent tore up premium receipt book).
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and returned a policy with a different beneficiary and with
the face value reduced to $45 if the insured died within six
months, as did in fact occur.121 Another agent changed the
number on a receipt book from that of a straight life policy
for $250 to that of a health and accident policy with only a
$50 death benefit. 122 One plaintiff was an ignorant and illiter-
ate Negro woman who was intelligent enough to notice that
the policy the agent took had a green border ($296 death
benefit) but the one he returned had a purple border ($26.10
death benefit) .123
c. Release fraudulently procured. Procuring a release by
fraud will sustain a verdict for punitive damages in a suit
for breach of the contract. Thus, it is fraud to tell an insured
that a release in full is merely an application for a week's
sick benefits. 124 It is also fraud to induce an insured to sign
a release by telling him the company was going out of busi-
ness but would pay him something out of sympathy if he
would execute the release, when he had a valid substantial
claim under the policy and when the company was merely
being bought out by another one. 2 5 Likewise it is fraud to
print a release in full on the back of a check given for weekly
sick benefits when the ignorant insured thinks he is merely
indorsing the check. 20 However, in these fraudulent release
cases the claim of fraud is subject to many defenses, particu-
larly negligence of the insured to inform himself what he is
signing ;127 and there is the additional requirement that be-
fore a release can be attacked for fraud, the consideration
received for it must be tendered back.12 8
121. Myers v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 170 S. C. 80, 169 S. E.
676 (1933).
122. Barber v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 189 S. C. 108, 200
S. E. 102 (1938) (verdict of $1,500 punitive damages reduced to $1,000
by trial judge).
123. Speed v. American Workmen, 199 S. C. 187, 18 S. E. 2d 732 (1942)
(verdict of $800 punitive damages reduced by trial judge to $400 "to
promote substantial justice").
124. See Bailey v. N. C. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 S. C. 131, 175 S. E.
73 (1934).
125. Hedgepath v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 169 S. C. 364,
168 S. E. 857 (1933) ($1,900.80 punitive damages).
126. Sutton v. Continental Casualty Co., 168 S. C. 372, 167 S. E. 647
(1933).
127. See Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S. C. 178, 14 S. E. 2d
886, 136 A. L. R. 1 (1941).
128. Rice v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 196 S. C. 410, 13 S. E. 2d
493 (1941); King v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 181 S. C. 238, 187 S. E. 369
(1936).
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d. Inducing a physical examination. In one case the agent
induced the plaintiff to apply for reinstatement of her policy
by falsely representing to her that the company had to check
its policies once every seven years, and further induced her
to submit to a physical examination by telling her the policy
had lapsed for late payment of premiums. The company then
declared her uninsurable because of poor health and lapsed
her policy. The jury found that she had paid the premiums
within the grace period and awarded substantial actual dam-
ages and $750 punitive damages; the Supreme Court
affirmed.
12 9
e. Inducing application for cash surrender value. In one
case, one of three fraudulent acts was defendant's inducing
plaintiff to apply for the cash surrender value of his policy
by furnishing him with the proper application forms; this
was a fraudulent act because the company did not intend to
pay at the time they furnished the papers. 30
f. Inducing insured to take out higher priced policy. One
defendant lapsed a policy which had a monthly premium of
$1.50, representing falsely to plaintiff that an act of the
legislature had made the policy illegal and that it would vio-
late the law to re-instate it, in an attempt to induce plaintiff
to take out a new policy with a monthly premium of $2.57.1
31
2. Fraudulent Ommissions
a. Failure to collect premiums in violation of established
custom. Perhaps the most common fraudulent act to be found
in our cases is the failure of insurance agents to collect
premiums. The law is well settled that if an insurance com-
pany deliberately discontinues collection of premiums from
the insured in violation of its established custom and with the
intention of cancelling a policy on which rights have accrued,
a verdict awarding punitive damages will be affirmed. 13 2 The
usual custom of agents is to collect premiums on industrial
129. Weaver v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 197 S. C. 363, 15 S. E. 2d 673
(1941).
130. Scott v. Bankers Reserve Life Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 242, 190 S. E.
713 (1937).
131. Strawhorn v. Standard Mutual Life Assn., 195 S. C. 448, 12 S. E.
2d 4 (1940).
132. Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 227 S. C. 239, 87
S. E. 2d 685 (1955) ($950 punitive damages). See Raines v. Life Ins.
Co. of Va., 228 S. C. 601, 605, 91 S. E. 2d 286 (1956).
19581
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insurance at the home of the insured or at his place of em-
ployment either weekly or monthly. Even though the policy
provides that premiums are to be paid at the home office,
a jury question as to waiver of this provision is presented if
the agent has established a contrary custom of collecting from
the insured. 133 In a typical case the plaintiff was an ignorant
Negro woman who had paid a weekly premium of thirty cents
for perhaps a year on a policy carrying $6 a week sickness
or accident benefits; she was sick in bed for twelve weeks;
defendant's agent paid her $12 for the first two weeks, then
stopped collecting premiums when he saw her sick in bed;
about a year later he returned and induced her to accept $12
in full settlement and to surrender the policy to him; a verdict
for the plaintiff of $48 actual and $1475 punitive damages was
affirmed. 3 4 Usually there is some circumstance in addition
to the mere failure to collect premiums from which fraud may
be inferred, such as the sickness of the insured at the last col-
lection, 3 5 the agent's other knowledge of the bad health of
the insured, 30 the fact that the insured had already paid more
premiums than the face value of the policy, 13T or the fact that
premiums had been collected regularly for ten years. 1 38
Several things may defeat a recovery of punitive damages
for this fraudulent act. The plaintiff may fail to prove an
established custom. 3 9 There may be no proof that the collec-
tions were discontinued with the intention of causing a
lapse.' 40 The insured may not have made reasonable efforts
to pay premiums at the insurer's office.' 4 1 Or, in the cases
where the insured had moved, the agent may have made re-
133. Riley v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 184 S. C. 383, 192 S. E.
394 (1937) ($1,000 punitive damages).
134. Bradley v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 170 S. C. 509,
171 S. E. 243 (1933).
135. Ibid.
136. Clinkscales v. North Carolina Mutual Life Ins. Co., 201 S. C.
375, 23 S. E. 2d 1 (1942); Alexander v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 181 S. C.
331, 187 S. E. 425 (1936).
137. See Simmons v. Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 223 S. C. 407, 76
S. E. 2d 288 (1953) (company had collected over $200 on straight life
policy with $150 death benefits).
138. Mack v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 171 S. C. 350, 172 S. E.
305 (1934).
139. Irby v. N. C. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 231 S. C. 164, 97 S. E. 2d 517
(1957).
140. Raines v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 228 S. C. 601, 91 S. E. 2d 286
(1956) ; Harris v. United Ins. Co., 227 S. C. 593, 88 S. E. 2d 672 (1955).
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peated unsuccessful efforts to locate him;142 if the agent
makes even some efforts to locate him, that may be sufficient
to prevent recovery of punitive damages even though his
efforts are so inadequate as to amount to negligence and
hence support a recovery of actual damages for breach of the
contract.14 3
b. Refusal to collect or accept premiums with intent to
lapse. A fraudulent act similar to failure to collect premiums
contrary to established custom is an insurer's refusal to col-
lect or accept premiums with the intention of lapsing or can-
celling a policy upon which rights have accrued. These two
fraudulent acts are similar in some respects, but in the latter,
there need be no violation of established custom. If the insurer
refuses to collect or accept premiums with the intention of
cancelling a policy upon which rights have accrued, a verdict
awarding punitive damages will be affirmed.1 44 However, it
would seem that if no rights have accrued under the policy, no
punitive damages could be recovered. 145 Actions based on this
fraudulent act are often referred to as actions for "fraudulent
cancellation" in our cases. In one illustrative case, plaintiff
was beneficiary on a policy on her son's life; defendant's agent
refused to accept premiums on it, telling plaintiff that such
an act would be unlawful since her son had been sentenced
to life imprisonment, and that the policy was cancelled on
orders from headquarters. 146 In another case the plaintiff
desired to make one further payment that would pay up his
policy for ten years so that he could borrow on it; defendant's
agents would not accept the payment and kept shuttling
him between the two of them because the agent in charge
142. Register v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 213 S. C. 508, 50 S. E. 2d 197
(1948).
143. See Pack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 S. C. 272, 182 S. E.
747 (1935).
144. Davis v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 195 S. C. 406, 11 S. E. 2d 433
(1940) ; Scott v. Bankers Reserve Life Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 242, 190 S. E.
713 (1937) (one of three fraudulent acts); Latta v. Sovereign Camp,
W. 0. W., 182 S. C. 215, 189 S. E. 126 (1936) ($1,500 punitive damages;
prior appeal. 179 S. C. 376, 184 S. E. 157); Sturkie v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., 180 S. C. 177, 185 S. E. 541 (1936) ($1,500 punitive dam-
ages); Mitchell v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn., 173 S. C.
265, 182 S. E. 892 (1935); Schultz v. Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employees,
175 S. C. 182, 178 S. E. 867 (1935); Wilkes v. Carolina Life Ins. Co.,
166 S. C. 475, 165 S. E. 188 (1932).
145. See Raines v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 228 S. C. 601, 605, 91 S. E. 2d
286 (1956).
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of the policy at the time the loan went through would
be penalized $5.147
c. Failure to send premium notices. Another act which may
be fraudulent is the failure of an insurance company to send
notice of premiums due when there is an established custom to
do so.14' This has not been the sole fraudulent act in any case
to date, however.
d. Failure either to refund money or deliver policy. In one
case plaintiff paid defendant's agent $1000 in a lump sum for
two $500 endowment policies; by failing either to refund the
money or to deliver the policies, defendant became liable for
$950 punitive damages, for payment to the agent was pay-
ment to defendant, and defendant failed to correct the situa-
tion after knowing of it.140i However, if failure to refund
money had been the sole fraudulent act, there could have been
no recovery of punitive damages. 150
e. Fraudulent concealment. In one case plaintiff had
brought a previous suit as beneficiary on policy A for $250 on
the life of his son and defendant obtained a verdict by prov-
that policy A had lapsed and that the premiums supposedly
paid on it had in reality been paid on policy B. Plaintiff then
sued on policy B and recovered $700 actual and punitive dam-
ages on the theory that defendant acted fraudulently in con-
cealing from him the existence of the second policy.15'
f. Refusal to furnish claim blanks upon request. There is
some doubt as to whether or not an insurer's refusal to fur-
nish the insured with blanks to apply for benefits under the
policy upon his request can be a fraudulent act. In the Jamison
case' 52 that was one possible fraudulent act among several.
And in the Alexander case' 5 the Court expressly affirmed a
147. Knox v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 190 S. C. 504, 3 S. E. 2d 245
(1939).
148. See Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 225 S. C. 236, 81
S. E. 2d 359 (1954); Harwell v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Assn.,
207 S. C. 150, 35 S. E. 2d 160, 161 A. L. R. 183 (1945); Jamison v.
American Workmen Ins. Co., 169 S. C. 400, 169 S. E. 83 (1933).
149. Welch v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 9, 189 S. E. 809 (1936).
150. See Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., note 148 supra.
151. Dyson v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 176 S. C. 411, 180 S. E.
475 (1935).
152. Jamison v. American Workmen Ins. Co., 169 S. C. 400, 169 S. E.
83 (1933).
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charge that it was an insurer's duty to furnish such blanks
and that its refusal to do so upon request of the insured would
be a fraudulent breach of the contract justifying punitive
damages if done with the intention of defrauding. However,
in the Shearer case,'5 4 in which the agent promised to get the
claim blanks for the insured but failed to do so, the Court
reversed an award of punitive damages, saying that such an
act was evidence of negligence or perhaps of wilfulness but
not of fraud. It seems that the decision as to punitive damages
in that case was based on the fact that after plaintiff no
longer paid premiums, the defendant kept the insurance alive
by charging the unpaid premiums as loans against the policy
until its loan value was exhausted, its actions thus negating
the inference of fraud. Then in the King case 55 the Court
reversed an award of punitive damages, saying that such
refusal to furnish application blanks was evidence of a wrong-
ful act, but was not evidence of a fraudulent breach accompa-
nied by a fraudulent act, relying on the Shearer case50 as
precedent, thus seeming to hold that it could not be a fraudu-
lent act as a matter of law.
3. Miscellaneous Fraudulent Acts
a. Conveying land to third party in breach of promise to
reconvey. In two cases arising on demurrers the defendant in
each case held legal title to land conveyed to him by plaintiff
but had contracted to reconvey to the plaintiff upon payment
of a certain amount of money, and, in breach of his promise
to reconvey, defendant conveyed to a third party a portion of
the tract in one case1 57 and all of it in the other.'5 s In each
case the Court said that the conveyance was a fraudulent act
accompanying the breach of contract subjecting him to puni-
tive damages.' 59
154. Shearer v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 490, 191 S. E. 315
(1937).
155. King v. N. C. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 194 S. C. 367, 9 S. E. 2d 788
(1940).
156. Note 154 supra.
157. Ford v. Ball, 178 S. C. 111, 182 S. E. 319 (1935). Another pos-
sible fraudulent act in this case, besides conveying away the land, was a
deceitful representation that defendant would deliver to plaintiff a
written contract to reconvey.
158. Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Ann. Cas. 407
(1904).
159. Welborn v. Dixon, ibid., involved a deed intended as a mortgage.
It is a very unusual case in that it was an action at law (first cause
of action) by the mortgagor-grantor against the mortgagee-grantee to
1958]
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b. Interfering with arbitration. In one case an insurance
adjuster assured plaintiff he would not interfere with the um-
pire and appraisers who were arbitrating the value of plain-
tiff's burned truck and carried plaintiff in his car away from
the scene of the arbitration back to work. Then when the ap-
praisers could not agree and called the umpire in, the insur-
ance adjuster went into the room with them and did most
of the talking. A verdict of $750 punitive damages was af-
firmed on grounds that partiality even without corruption
was sufficient fraud to set aside an arbitration award in
equity'00 and that there was sufficient evidence of the fraudu-
lent intent and acts of the adjuster to justify punitive
damages. 10'
c. Forgery. Where an insurance agent forged plaintiff's
name to receipts for claims filed under a life and health
policy, received the money from defendant, his employer, and
converted the money to his own use, defendant was held liable
to plaintiff for $490 punitive damages. 62
d. Seizing sharecropper's portion of crops. Where the de-
fendant ran plaintiff, his sharecropper, off the place after
the crop was laid by, he was held liable in actual damages for
breaching his contract and in punitive damages for his fraud-
ulent act in taking exclusive possession of plaintiff's half of
the crop.'63
recover damages for breach of a contract to reconvey the land. Ordi-
narily, in cases of deeds intended as mortgages where the mortgagee-
grantee has disposed of the land to a third party, suit is brought in
equity to have the deed declared a mortgage. See annot., 46 A. L. R.
1089 (1927). There have been cases in South Carolina in which the
grantee-mortgagee has conveyed to a third party in breach of a contract
to reconvey to the mortgagor-grantor in which no action was brought on
the contract but in which suit was brought in equity to redeem the land
or for equivalent relief. For example, it has been held: 1) the mortgagee-
grantee must account to mortgagor-grantor for proceeds received from
sale less the mortgage debt, Mason v. Finley, 129 S. C. 367, 124 S. E.
780 (1924); 2) the mortgagor-grantor can redeem the land from a
purchaser from the mortgagee-grantee who does not qualify as a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice, Manigault v. Lofton, 78 S. C.
499, 59 S. E. 534 (1907); Bristow v. Rosenberg, 45 S. C. 614, 23 S. E.
957 (1896); 3) but he cannot redeem from such a purchaser who does
qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, see Jones v.
Hudson, 23 S. C. 494 (1885).
160. See annotation, 8 A. L. R. 1083.
161. Smith v. Home Ins. Co., 178 S. C. 436, 183 S. E. 166 (1936) (one
of the few cases awarding punitive damages for breach of a fire in-
surance contract).
162. West v. Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 220 S. C. 198, 66 S. E. 2d
816 (1951).
163. Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S. C. 137, 108 S. E. 189 (1921). The
legal relationship between the parties appears to have been one of land-
[Vol. 10
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e. Fraudulent easement scheme. In one case the defendant
had promised orally to allow plaintiff to lay a water pipe line
across his property to reach city water, deceiving plaintiff
into believing that the street privately owned by defendant
was a public way. After digging had begun, defendant stopped
the work, thus breaching his contract. The Court sustained a
verdict awarding actual damages for the breach of contract
and punitive damages for the deceit, for the whole scheme
was a fraud, in the breach as well as in the inception.0 4
f. Falsifying weight records. In a case from another state
following a similar rule, where a defendant contracted to har-
vest, process and buy a crop to be grown by plaintiff, and not
owner-sharecropper and not one of landlord-tenant. See Fischer, Legal
Aspects of Farm Tenancy and Sharecropping in South Carolita, 9
S. C. L. Q. 341 (1957). If so, it was in effect an employment contract.
Fischer, supra. at 304.
In no other South Carolina cases involving employment contracts have
punitive damages been allowed for a fraudulent act accompanying a
breach of the contract. In Smyth v. Fleischmann, note 79a supra, the
Court held that allegations as to punitive damages were appropriate,
but the cause of action there was held to be one for fraud and deceit
in inducing the contract, not for its fraudulent breach. In Holland v.
Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., note 106 supra, there was no allega-
tion of a fraudulent act accompanying the breach of contract.
In Cooksey v. Beaumont Mfg. Co., 194 S. C. 395, 9 S. E. 2d 790 (1940),
plaintiff, a watchman, alleged that defendant had breached its contract
and its duty imposed by a statute requiring time and a half pay for
Sunday work by giving him only a 10c a week raise and by cutting his
pay from 34c to 32c per hour without notice to him. The Court held that
a jury question was presented as to actual damages for breach of con-
tract and of the statutory duty but found error in a refusal to charge
that plaintiff was estopped to claim a higher wage by continuing in the
week to week employment knowing of the change in his pay. However,
the Court reversed the verdict as to punitive damages, saying (194
S. C. at 401): "We do not think there was evidence of such a wanton
disregard of defendant's obligations and duties as would warrant this
Court in finding that there was a fraudulent act accompanying the
breach of contract."
Likewise, the federal court failed to find an allegation of a fraudu-
lent act in the breach of a salesman's contract which breach was al-
legedly malicious and fraudulent. Sadler v. Pennsylvania Refining Co.,
31 F. Supp. 1 (W. D. S. C. 1940, J. Wyche).
In Monroe v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., Westbrook's Adv. Ops.,
Feb. 22, 1958, the two fraudulent acts allegedly accompanying the breach
of an insurance agent's agency contract were: 1) that the local manager
cancelled the contract because plaintiff had by-passed his office in
applying for and obtaining leave of absence from the District Manager,
and 2) that defendant withheld commissions due her with intent to
defraud her. A jury verdict awarding no actual damages but $2,890
punitive damages was reversed and judgment entered for defendant.
Thus to summarize, the law as to employment contracts appears to
follow the general rule that before punitive damages can be recovered,
there must be a fraudulent act accompanying the breach. There are no
theoretical bars to punitive damages in such cases, but as a practical
matter, recovery of punitive damages on this theory seems difficult.
164. Porter v. Mullins, 198 S. C. 325, 17 S. E. 2d 684 (1941).
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only failed to pay plaintiff for the amount actually harvested,
but also falsified the weight records, he was held liable for
$500 punitive damages, the New Mexico Supreme Court say-
ing he was fortunate to get off so cheap. 16 5
g. Other acts. In the Yarborough case'01 there were several
possible fraudulent acts, among them failure to give receipts
for one month's premiums plaintiff had paid and also an at-
tempt to cancel his health and accident policy unless he would
accept a rider which would exempt some ailments his wife
had recently developed, the rider to be retroactive to a period
for which the premiums had already been paid. A verdict for
$7.50 actual and $1000 punitive damages was affirmed, the
Court saying that while some of the acts considered sepa-
rately might not evidence bad faith, all the circumstances
taken together reasonably warranted an inference of breach
of contract accompanied by fraudulent acts.
IV. IS THE SOUTH CAROLINA RULE SOUND IN
PRINCIPLE?
Under the "independent tort" rule as followed in Texas,
exemplary damages are recoverable in an action for breach
of contract only when the breach is accompanied by an inde-
pendent tort ".. . for which an action would lie for exemplary
damages, independently of any right to recover actual dam-
ages by reason of the breach of contract alone."'1 7 In other
words, under that rule, before the plaintiff can recover puni-
tive damages in a contract action, he must in reality have two
causes of action, one for breach of contract and another for
an aggravated tort which must accompany the breach and
for which tort punitive damages would be recoverable inde-
pendently of the contract.
In one statement of the South Carolina rule, Justice Hydrick
said that punitive damages were not recoverable in an action
for breach of contract "... in the absence of circumstances
giving rise to a cause of action for fraud."'168 This statement
might lead one to believe that the South Carolina rule is but
a variation of the Texas "independent tort" rule, but re-
165. Whitehead v. Allen, 63 N. M1. 63, 313 P. 2d 335 (1957).
166. Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 225 S. C. 236, 81 S. E. 2d
359 (1954).
167. Hooks v. Fitzenrieter, 76 Tex. 277, 13 S. W. 230 (1890).
168. Reaves v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 110 S. C. 233, 238, 96
S. E. 295 (1918).
476 [Vol. 10
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stricted to fraud as the only permissible tort. If this were so,
there would be little doubt but that our rule is sound in prin-
ciple. Let us examine the cases and see if this is so. In other
words, in every case in which punitive damages were recov-
ered for a fraudulent act accompanying the breach of con-
tract, would it have been possible for the plaintiff to have
maintained an action for the fraudulent act alone and to have
recovered punitive damages for it, apart from the breach of
contract? Or, to put it differently, if it were not for our
hybrid action of fraudulent breach of contract, could an action
in which punitive damages are allowed be maintained for every
fraudulent act in our cases? This depends on the nature of
the fraudulent act.
For purposes of analysis, the fraudulent acts in our cases
can be divided into the two broad classes of representations
and omissions. A few fraudulent acts, such as conveying away
land held under a mortgage, may not fall into either class,
but most fraudulent acts fall into one or the other category.
A. REPRESENTATIONS
It is clear that if a representation is a component of the
fraudulent act, a separate action in which punitive damages
could be recovered could be maintained for the fraudulent
representation alone, although there may be other fraudulent
acts along with the representation, such as retention of an
insurance policy obtained by means of a fraudulent represen-
tation made to the insured. That action would be an action at
law in tort for fraud and deceit, the elements of which are :160
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality;
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) his intent
that it should be acted upon by the person; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its
truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) and his conse-
quent and proximate injury.
If the nine elements were present in the representation, a
tort action for deceit could be maintained for it. In the usual
deceit case the fraudulent representation accompanies the
formation of a contract, but there is no reason why it could
not be remedied in a deceit action if it accompanied the
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breach. Thus, in one deceit case an insurance agent obtained
possession of plaintiff's paid up policy by promising to revive
it, and the company failed to revive it or to return it ;170 the
fraudulent act was similar to that in many fraudulent breach
cases where a policy is retained, but plaintiff could not have
sued on that theory because his policy was paid up; it had
not been breached. In another deceit case the fraudulent act
was an insurance agent's fraudulent representations inducing
plaintiff to make an exchange of policies, 171 a situation quite
similar to the fraudulent breach cases in which a policy is
substituted.
Of course, as a practical matter, where a contract has been
breached and there has been a fraudulent act accompanying
it, the plaintiff will sue for breach of contract accompanied
by fraudulent act rather than in tort for deceit; for in the
latter action he can recover nothing if no fraud is proved,
while in the former action even though no fraud is proved,
thus preventing him from recovering punitive damages, he
can nevertheless recover actual damages for the breach of
contract if that is proved.1 2 And even the slightest nominal
damages resulting from the breach would be sufficient to sup-
port a verdict for punitive damages in an action for fraudu-
lent breach if fraud were proved.'7 3
Punitive damages are recoverable in a deceit action because
of the wilful and intentional nature of the tort.'1 Thus, if the
fraudulent act were a representation actionable in deceit
apart from the breach of contract, the only substantial theo-
retical objection to allowing recovery of punitive damages for
it in an action ex contractu would be based on an adherence
to the distinction between the common law actions of assump-
sit and trespass on the case. This seems the view of the
English court and of most American courts, that punitive
damages are recoverable in tort, but not in contract, and that
one consequence of a plaintiff's choosing to sue in contract is
170. Cook v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 S. C. 77, 194 S. E. 636
(1938) ($256 punitive damages).
171. Grayson v. Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. C. 130, 103 S. E. 477
(1920).
172. Broome v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 413, 191 S. E. 220 (1937).
173. See Barnes v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 201 S. C. 188,
193,22 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).
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that he can recover no more than actual damages.' .7 However,
it would seem "an arbitrary and illogical limitation" to con-
fine punitive damages to actions ex delicto.7 6 Particularly is
this so since the advent of the modern procedural codes which
purport to abolish the common law forms of action.17 7 This is
the reasoning behind the "independent tort" rule in Texas
where the forms of action have never been in force.178 The
most weighty reason favorable to a continued adherence to the
orthodox common law doctrine is the rule of stare decisis and
the fear that a change would unsettle the law of contracts. 179
But once a contrary rule has been adopted as in Texas and
in South Carolina, the same reason applies with equal force
for adhering to it.
B. OMIssIoNs
A more difficult problem is presented by those fraudulent
acts which we may classify as fraudulent omissions and which
may be termed "negative acts." The fraudulent acts falling
into this class are the more numerous in our cases, and in-
clude such things as failure to collect premiums in violation
of established custom and refusal to accept premiums with
the intention of causing a lapse of the policy. These fraudu-
lent acts could not be the basis of a tort action for deceit, in
the usual case. Take, for example, the situation typical in our
cases where the insurance agent establishes the custom of col-
lecting premiums at the home of the insured, the insured
becomes ill, and the agent then forms the intention of causing
a lapse of the policy by discontinuing collections and does so.
Here there could be no tort action for deceit, for that action
remedies only fraudulent representations. It would be hard
to find a fraudulent representation in the above example, but
even if the established custom of dealing be said to be a rep-
resentation implied from his conduct that the agent will con-
tinue regular collections in the future, how could it be said
that the representation was made with intent to defraud? At
175. Addis v. Gramophone Co., Ltd., [1909] A. C. 488, 3 B. R. C. 98,
16 Ann. Cas. 98 (House of Lords) (See especially opinion of Lord
Atkinson at [1909] A. C. 488, 496).
176. Id. at 498 (dissenting opinion of Lord Collins).
177. Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 116, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Ann. Cas.
407 (1904).
178. See Briggs v. Rodriguez, 236 S. W. 2d 510, 515 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951).
179. See dissent of Woods, J., in Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108 at 122.
1958]
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss3/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10
the time the agent was making the representation, that is,
establishing the custom of regular collections, he did not have
the intent to defraud the insured by causing a lapse; it was
only later, when the insured became ill, that his deceitful in-
tention was formed. Thus, the elements of a tort action for
deceit are lacking.
If South Carolina did not allow recovery of punitive dam-
ages in a fraudulent breach action, the only remedy at law
of the insured in the example above would be an action for
breach of contract in which he could recover only actual dam-
ages. The insured would have another remedy for fraudulent
cancellation of his insurance policy, however, but it would
be in equity, not at law. Where an insurer wrongfully cancels
a policy, equity will set aside the cancellation and order the
policy reinstated. South Carolina cases have by dicta recog-
nized such a remedy, 18 0 but no case has been found in which
this remedy was sought for a wrongful or fraudulent cancella-
tion, probably because the action at law for actual and puni-
tive damages is so much more satisfactory to the plaintiff.
But such a remedy has been sought and such relief granted
elsewhere.1 8' Thus, a fraudulent omission would be actionable
only in equity, if there were no action for fraudulent breach
of contract.
However, punitive damages could not be recovered in
equity 82 because it is beyond the power of a court of chancery
to award them. 8 3 Hence a litigant waives all right to recover
punitive damages when he goes into equity. 8 4
180. See Shuler v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 184 S. C. 485,
490, 193 S. E. 46 (1937); Davis v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 227 S. C.
587, 591, 88 S. E. 2d 658 (1955).
181. E. g., Tabor v. Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co., 44 Mich. 324, 6
N. W. 830 (1880) (fraudulent cancellation); Meyer v. Knickerbocker
Life Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 516, 29 Am. Rep. 200 (1878) (wrongful cancella-
tion) ; Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co., 140 Pa. St. 193, 21 At. 392, 23
Am. St. Rep. 225, 11 L. R. A. 857 (1891) (policy surrendered through
mutual mistake); First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 125 Tex. 377,
82 S. W. 2d 635 (1935) (wrongful cancellation).
182. Sce Standard Warehouse Co. v. A. C. L. RR, 222 S. C. 93 at 102-
103, 71 S. E. 2d 893 (1952) ; Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 118, 49 S. E.
232, 3 Ann. Cas. 407 (1904) ; Busby v. Mitchell, 29 S. C. 447, 452, 7 S. E.
618 (1888). See Annotation, 48 A. L. R. 2d 947.
183. See Mortgage Loan Co. v. Townsend, 156 S. C. 203, 229, 152 S. E.
878 (1930); Bratton v. Catawba Power Co., 80 S. C. 260, 263, 60 S. E.
673 (1908).
184. See Bird v. W. & M. RR Co., 8 Rich. Eq. 46, 57, 64 Am. Dec. 739
(S. C. 1855).
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Hence, we are forced to conclude that South Carolina does
not follow the "independent tort" rule restricted to fraud as
the independent tort. And it follows that the statement of
Justice Hydrick 8 5 is an accurate statement of the present
status of the rule only if it includes both legal and equitable
causes of action for fraud. Hence, we must conclude that inso-
far as fraudulent omissions are concerned (equitable causes
of action for fraud), our rule is not sound in principle, unless
there is some other reason for it.
The justification for the rule lies in the policy of the courts
to suppress fraud.8s The method of executing this policy is
by punishing the defendant found guilty of fraud by assessing
punitive damages against him as in the case of any other
wilful and intentional wrong. The reasons for allowing re-
covery of punitive damages in the usual tort case are two-fold.
From the aspect of the plaintiff personally, they are allowed
to vindicate his private right where it has been violated wan-
tonly, wilfully, or maliciously. 187 And from the aspect of
society, they are allowed in the interest of society as punish-
ment of the wrongdoer to prevent him from repeating the
wrongful act and as a warning and example to deter others
from committing like offenses. 8
From a technical legal point of view, it may be necessary
to distinguish between tort and contract and between legal
and equitable causes of action for fraud. But from the view-
point of policy, these distinctions are not so important. If the
policy of the courts is to suppress fraud, then they should
suppress it by awarding punitive damages to the defrauded
plaintiff to punish the defrauding defendant, whether his
fraud be legal or equitable in nature. A fraud actionable only
in equity can be just as damaging to the plaintiff and just as
185. Reaves v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 110 S. C. 233, 238, 96
S. E. 295 (1918): "Nor is there any doubt of the rule that punitive
damages are not recoverable for the mere breach of a private contract,
in the absence of circumstances giving rise to a cause of action for
fraud."
186. See Thomas v. The American Workmen, 197 S. C. 178, 182, 14
S. E. 2d 886, 136 A. L. R. 1 (1941): "The policy of the Courts is, on
the one hand, to suppress fraud, and on the other, not to encourage
negligence and inattention to one's own interest. Either course has
obvious dangers. But the unmistakable drift is toward the just doctrine
that a wrongdoer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the
law to condemn the credulity of the ignorant and unwary."
187. See Beaudrot v. Southern Ry., 69 S. C. 160, 48 S.E. 106 (1904).
188. See Bowers v. C. & W. C. Rly., 210 S. C. 367, 42 S. E. 2d 705
(1947) (concurring opinion of Oxner, J.).
1958]
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socially reprehensible as one actionable at law for deceit. An
omission or concealment can be as fraudulent as a represen-
tation or other affirmative act. 8 9 Therefore, if an omission
is the result of the defendant's intent to defraud, it should be
punished as much as should an affirmative act done with the
same intent.
V. CONCLUSION
The defendants who have felt the weight of South Caro-
lina's peculiar rule most heavily have been the insurance com-
panies, which, at times, have complained that they have been
treated unfairly in the courts of this state by having punitive
damages awarded against them.10 And, undoubtedly, some
juries have been harsh with them. However, the largest ver-
dict to date assessing punitive damages against an insurance
company in a fraudulent breach case was one for $2,000,101
a sum which does not compare, for example,9 2 with the puni-
tive damages which have been awarded in some personal in-
jury and wrongful death cases.
Insurance companies should recognize the fact that they
owe a higher duty to the people with whom they deal than do
most other types of business. For example, their agents have
a duty to use due care in forwarding applications for insur-
ance to the company.9 3 And the company is probably under
the duty to accept or reject the application within a reason-
able time.
1 4
189. Donaldson v. Temple, 96 S. C. 240, 244, 80 S. E. 437 (1913)
(dissent).
190. See Mooney, Punitive Damages for Breach of Insurance Contracts
in South Carolina, Insurance Law Journal (Jan. 1955), p. 20.
191. In Bradley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 S. C. 303, 160 S. E.
721 (1931). A verdict for $1,900.80 punitive damages was recovered
and affirmed in Hedgepath v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 169
S. 0. 364, 168 S. E. 857 (1933). A verdict of $2,890 punitive damages
was reversed in Monroe v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., Westbrook's
Adv. Ops., Feb. 22, 1958, because not supported by actual damages.
192. See, e. g., Block v. Atlantic Coast Line RR, 227 S. C. 245, 87 S. E.
2d 830 (1955) in which a verdict of $50,000 actual and $15,000 puni-
tive damages for the wrongful death of a twelve year old child was
affirmed over objections of excessiveness, and the cases cited therein.
193. Tobacco Redrying Corp. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 185
S. C. 162, 193 S. E. 426 (1937). Plaintiff applied to defendant's agent
for both public liability insurance and for employer's liability insur-
ance; the agent sent to defendant the application for the former but failed
to send that for the latter. After plaintiff had to pay for liability to an
employee, plaintiff sued in tort for negligence of the defendant's agent
in failing to forward the application which would have been accepted if
received. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
194. In Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 222 S. C. 492, 73 S. E.
2d 688 (1952), noted 5 S. C. L. Q. 613, plaintiff applied for life insur-
[Vol. 10
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In considering fraud with reference to insurance compa-
nies, two factors must be kept in mind: 1) the duty resting
upon the insurer and 2) the type of insured they deal with. As
to the first, our Supreme Court, following Pomeroy, 19 5 has
classified an insurance contract as one intrinsically fiduciary
in its essential nature, requiring the utmost good faith and
fullest disclosure of material facts.196 Consequently, an act
done by someone occupying such a fiduciary relationship
might well be fraudulent when it would not be so if done by
someone upon whom a lesser duty rests.
As to the second, the intelligence, experience, age, mental
and physical condition, and knowledge and means of acquiring
it on the part of the insured must be considered. 197 This is
bound up with the right to rely on the representation in tort
cases for fraud and deceit. Many of the plaintiffs recovering
punitive damages in our cases have been persons of the type
on whom fraud is most easily practiced, "the ignorant and
unwary," to use Mr. Justice Fishburne's phrase.198 Insurance
companies doing business in South Carolina, seeking their for-
tunes from the people of this state, must take them as they
find them; and if some of them are easily misled due to lack
of educational opportunities or otherwise, the insurance com-
panies should blame only their own agents for not exhibiting
more prudence, caution, patience, restraint and honesty. They
should not blame our Court for developing, and our juries for
applying, a rule of law which makes it possible to punish
frauds merely because other states have apparently not seen
fit to punish them, or at least not in the same manner.
ance on her husband on March 3, 1951, paying a deposit of 20 cents.
The husband was killed June 3, and, although the company rejected
the application on March 19, plaintiff was not notified until after his
death. In a suit to recover on the policy, a verdict for plaintiff was
affirmed 3-2, the majority of the court resting its decision on the
grounds that there had been an implied acceptance of the offer [appli-
cation]. 222 S. C. at 502. A tort action may possibly exist for such
delay. 222 S. C. at 503. The Court quoted from 12 APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTIcs § 7226: "'The more liberal, and probably the
better rule, is to the effect that an insurance company obtaining an
application for insurance is under a duty to accept it or to reject it within
a reasonable time, and is liable if it delays unreasonably in acting there-
on. It must also act with reasonable promptness in delivering a
policy.... ))P
195. 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 902, 907 (5th ed. 1941).
196. See Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S. C. 427, 23 S. E. 2d 372
(1942).
197. See Thomas v. The American Workmen, 197 S. C. 178, 182, 14
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When the British House of Lords decided that punitive
damages could not be recovered in an action ex contractu, one
of its reasons was that if the plaintiff had a cause of action
in tort for the wrongful act accompanying the breach, he
could recover punitive damages in a tort action; but if not,
the wrongful act should not become actionable or relevant as
an element of aggravation of the breach of contract. 199 But
the very thing that would make some fearful of our peculiar
rule may be its greatest worth: it nkes possible the punish-
ment of frauds which the law has not otherwise developed
adequate means of remedying. Thus, in the leading English
case, Lord Collins in dissent said that the power of the jury
to award punitive damages should not be curtailed, for it is
II... a salutary power, which has justified itself in practical
experience, to redress wrongs for which there may be... no
other remedy."-200 The eminent lord could have been speaking
of South Carolina's peculiar rule.
HENRY SUmmERALL, JR.
199. Addis v. Gramophone Co., Ltd., [19091 A. C. 488, 3 B. R. C. 98,
16 Ann. Cas. 98 (House of Lords) (concurring opinion of Lord Shaw
of Dunfermline).
200. Id. at 500 (dissent).
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